As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into applications serving users across diverse cultures, communities and demographics, it is critical to align LLMs with pluralistic human values beyond average principles (e.g., HHH). In psychological and social value theories such as Schwartz's Value Theory, pluralistic values are represented by multiple value dimensions paired with various priorities. However, existing methods encounter two challenges when aligning with such fine-grained value objectives: 1) they often treat multiple values as independent and equally important, ignoring their interdependence and relative priorities (value complexity); 2) they struggle to precisely control nuanced value priorities, especially those underrepresented ones (value steerability). To handle these challenges, we propose COUPLE, a COUnterfactual reasoning framework for PLuralistic valuE alignment. It introduces a structural causal model (SCM) to feature complex interdependency and prioritization among features, as well as the causal relationship between high-level value dimensions and behaviors. Moreover, it applies counterfactual reasoning to generate outputs aligned with any desired value objectives. Benefitting from explicit causal modeling, COUPLE also provides better interpretability. We evaluate COUPLE on two datasets with different value systems and demonstrate that COUPLE advances other baselines across diverse types of value objectives.

The proliferation of AI-driven systems presents a fundamental challenge to Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), often diminishing user agency and failing to account for value pluralism. Current approaches to value alignment, which rely on centralized, top-down definitions, lack the mechanisms for meaningful contestability. This leaves users and communities unable to challenge or shape the values embedded in the systems that govern their digital lives, creating a crisis of legitimacy and trust. This paper introduces Community-Defined AI Value Pluralism (CDAVP), a socio-technical framework that addresses this gap. It reframes the design problem from achieving a single aligned state to infrastructuring a dynamic ecosystem for value deliberation and application. At its core, CDAVP enables diverse, self-organizing communities to define and maintain explicit value profiles - rich, machine-readable representations that can encompass not only preferences but also community-specific rights and duties. These profiles are then contextually activated by the end-user, who retains ultimate control (agency) over which values guide the AI's behavior. AI applications, in turn, are designed to transparently interpret these profiles and moderate conflicts, adhering to a set of non-negotiable, democratically-legitimated meta-rules. The designer's role shifts from crafting static interfaces to becoming an architect of participatory ecosystems. We argue that infrastructuring for pluralism is a necessary pathway toward achieving robust algorithmic accountability and genuinely contestable, human-centric AI.

Modelling human variation in rating tasks is crucial for enabling AI systems for personalization, pluralistic model alignment, and computational social science. We propose representing individuals using value profiles -- natural language descriptions of underlying values compressed from in-context demonstrations -- along with a steerable decoder model to estimate ratings conditioned on a value profile or other rater information. To measure the predictive information in rater representations, we introduce an information-theoretic methodology. We find that demonstrations contain the most information, followed by value profiles and then demographics. However, value profiles offer advantages in terms of scrutability, interpretability, and steerability due to their compressed natural language format. Value profiles effectively compress the useful information from demonstrations (>70% information preservation). Furthermore, clustering value profiles to identify similarly behaving individuals better explains rater variation than the most predictive demographic groupings. Going beyond test set performance, we show that the decoder models interpretably change ratings according to semantic profile differences, are well-calibrated, and can help explain instance-level disagreement by simulating an annotator population. These results demonstrate that value profiles offer novel, predictive ways to describe individual variation beyond demographics or group information.

Agents act to bring about a state of the world that is more compatible with their personal or institutional values. To formalise this intuition, the paper proposes an action framework based on the STRIPS formalisation. Technically, the contribution expresses actions in terms of Value-based Formal Reasoning (VFR), which provides a set of propositions derived from an Agent's value profile and the Agent's assessment of propositions with respect to the profile. Conceptually, the contribution provides a computational framework for a form of consequentialist ethics which is satisficing, pluralistic, act-based, and preferential.

Disagreements are common in online discussions. Disagreement may foster collaboration and improve the quality of a discussion under some conditions. Although there exist methods for recognizing disagreement, a deeper understanding of factors that influence disagreement is lacking in the literature. We investigate a hypothesis that differences in personal values are indicative of disagreement in online discussions. We show how state-of-the-art models can be used for estimating values in online discussions and how the estimated values can be aggregated into value profiles. We evaluate the estimated value profiles based on human-annotated agreement labels. We find that the dissimilarity of value profiles correlates with disagreement in specific cases. We also find that including value information in agreement prediction improves performance.

As AI systems are increasingly involved in decision making, it also becomes important that they elicit appropriate levels of trust from their users. To achieve this, it is first important to understand which factors influence trust in AI. We identify that a research gap exists regarding the role of personal values in trust in AI. Therefore, this paper studies how human and agent Value Similarity (VS) influences a human's trust in that agent. To explore this, 89 participants teamed up with five different agents, which were designed with varying levels of value similarity to that of the participants. In a within-subjects, scenario-based experiment, agents gave suggestions on what to do when entering the building to save a hostage. We analyzed the agent's scores on subjective value similarity, trust and qualitative data from open-ended questions. Our results show that agents rated as having more similar values also scored higher on trust, indicating a positive effect between the two. With this result, we add to the existing understanding of human-agent trust by providing insight into the role of value-similarity.